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1 Introduction
Some breakthroughs in communication technology—for instance, the invention of the
printing press or the telegraph—were followed by major economic transformations.
Similarly, the development of the railway networks in the nineteenth century had
dramatic effects on the pattern of trade and production in the global economy. This
paper examines how the ongoing information and communication (ICT) revolution is
likely to affect the global economy, and implications for public policy in the developing
countries.
It is customary to argue that the emergence of the so-called new economy has presented
developing countries with new opportunities for success but at the same time increased
the risk of their marginalization. To elaborate on these alternative possibilities, two
extreme scenarios are usually presented. In the optimistic scenario, new information and
communication technologies allow developing countries to bridge the technological gap
that exists between them and the developed world, enabling them to catch-up with (and,
with sufficient optimism, even ‘leapfrog’ over) the current economic leaders. The
alternative, dismal scenario, is that new technologies will enable faster growth in the
developed world, and the developing countries will languish. In this scenario the current
digital divide will create the basis of greater divergence in economic outcomes, both
between the developed and developing worlds, and within countries. Of course, both
scenarios lead to the same policy imperative: the idea that developing countries need to
invest more in ICT, if not to catch up, to prevent being left behind in the digital race.
It is hard to deny that participation in the new economy is extremely unequal at the
moment. Access to the Internet is a measure commonly used to quantify the digital gap.
For instance, it is estimated that in 2000, a fifth of the world’s people living in the
richest countries have 93 per cent of Internet users (and 86 per cent of the global GDP),
while the bottom fifth have only 0.2 per cent of Internet users.1 Inequality in access to
the new economy exceeds income inequality. While access to the Internet is a much-
discussed statistic, it is instructive to consider inequality in access for older and more
basic forms of communication. Thus, while there is universal access to telephones in the
developed world, in developing countries less than 10 per cent of the population have
access to telephones. Hammond (2001) estimates that more than half the world’s
population have never made a phone call.2
How does this manifestation of global inequality compare, on the scale of development
priorities, to other forms of global inequality? Specifically, how do we compare digital
poverty to more conventional forms of poverty in the developing countries—lack of
access to nutrition, basic healthcare, safe drinking water, and to education? Should the
developing countries divert scarce resources from these sectors in order to close the
digital gap?
1 See United Nations (2000). Similarly, UNDP (2001) estimates that in 2000, 79 per cent of the Internet
users lived in high-income OECD countries, which contain only 14 per cent of the global population.
2 The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) provides detailed country statistics on
telecommunications access. While the ITU aspires that each country works towards universal access,
it is sobering to note that this is defined as everyone in a country living within five kilometers of a
telephone.2
It is hard to believe that new technologies alone can address the basic needs of the poor
in developing countries.3 Rather, it is sometimes claimed that new technologies matter
because they offer a faster growth path out of poverty. The validity of this argument,
which emphasizes the investment aspect of ICT, depends on the link between
technology and productivity growth. While the issue has been debated, most people
would accept that modern ICT has had some positive impact on productivity. Jalava and
Pohjola (2001) offer evidence in support of this for two advanced economies. Of course,
in these economies, the adoption of modern technologies has been incremental and at
the same time, innovation has occurred in response to specific needs. What is the
relevance of these technologies for countries that are at a more primitive level of
technological achievement? In other words, what is the social rate of return to ICT
investment in developing countries? Further, can the design of appropriate institutions
and policies improve the likelihood of the optimistic outcome, i.e., convergence, over
divergence?4
2 The lessons of history
In the long sweep of history, the industrial revolution presents a fascinating study of
rapid economic transformation. In eighteenth-century Britain a series of technological
innovations made it possible to mechanize production, that is, to use machines run by
inanimate power to speed up repetitive tasks. Simultaneously, the creation of the factory
system—a crucial innovation in the organization of production—made it possible to
translate the benefits of mechanization into higher and cheaper output. Together the
innovations in technology and in the organization of production led to a dramatic
increase in productivity. While by modern standards the increase in the rate of economic
growth was small, over time it transformed the economy and the social order in Britain.
Other countries followed suit with their own industrial revolutions, but broadly speaking
this process was confined to a handful of countries in Western Europe. The real paradox
is that even as the accompanying improvements in transport and communications made
the world a much smaller place, the industrial revolutions fragmented the globe by
creating vast economic differences between industrial and pre-industrial societies.
Steam-powered ships could circumnavigate the earth with great speed and reliability,
but the economic gap between Western Europe and Asia widened.
It is tempting to conclude that technology has the power of rapid economic
transformation. However, while technological innovation may be necessary for an
industrial revolution, historically it has hardly been sufficient. As Quah (1999) has
pointed out, China’s technological achievements in the fourteenth century were
comparable to those that culminated in the industrial revolution in Britain four centuries
later.5 Yet, despite its technological readiness, there was no industrial revolution in
3 It is sobering to note even the champions of the new economy, such as Microsoft founder Bill Gates,
do not believe that investment in IT can solve the major problems of the developing world. Much of
the philanthropic work of the Gates Foundation aims to tackle the familiar problems of hunger, access
to drinking water, eradication of disease and illiteracy in developing countries.
4 For a general discussion of policy choices, see UNDP (2001) and UN (2000).
5 The Sung (960-1126) and Yuan (1127-1367) dynasties witnessed substantial technological progress.
Quah (1999) notes that fourteenth-century China ‘had solved the problems of making agriculture3
China at that time. Even more surprisingly, the speed of technological innovations
withered away from the fifteenth century onwards, and China’s technological lead soon
vanished. Why did an industrial revolution not occur in fourteenth-century China? Even
more surprisingly, why did technological development come to a halt, and perhaps even
regress, from the fifteenth century onwards?
In other words, technology alone cannot explain industrial revolutions in Western
Europe. The causes of European ‘exceptionalism’ remain a subject of academic debate.
One traditional view has been that while technology played an important and visible
role, industrial transformation required other essential ingredients. In order to invest in
new technologies, it was necessary to have access to capital and modes of finance that
insulated individuals from excessive risk; to have the right balance of skills to use the
new technologies; and the entrepreneurial spirit to engineer and embrace change. We
could label these other crucial ingredients as ‘social capital’. Thus, the argument goes,
while technology could be copied or acquired at some cost, social capital was much
harder to replicate. On a slightly different note, Pomeranz (2000) emphasizes the role
played by Britain’s Atlantic trade in relieving the scarcity of land and energy.6 Quah
(2002) conjectures that China’s inability to exploit its technological base could be
attributed to a failure of demand for technology. The Chinese state, which had long
provided patronage for new technologies and exercised strong control over access to
these technologies, seemingly withdrew its support after the fifteenth century, and this
led to technological blight. Regardless of which missing factor we hold responsible for
failure, even a cursory examination of history alerts us that investment in technology, by
itself, is unlikely to put the developing countries on a higher growth path.
A second historical lesson comes from the growth of railway networks in the nineteenth
century. The railways were the superhighways of their era, and there are remarkable
similarities between the Internet boom of the 1990s and the ‘railway mania’ of the
1840s. Interestingly, as Chancellor (1999) records, contemporary pamphlets and
journals spoke of the railways not just as a new form of transport, but as a revolutionary
advance unparalleled in the history of the world. Indeed, the arrival of the railways was
celebrated as a communications revolution.7
Widespread enthusiasm about the new technology led to a surge in the number of
railway construction companies, generating a stock-market boom. However, by the late
1840s, most of these railways companies had folded, with substantial losses for
highly productive, efficiently manufacturing fine textiles, exploiting and applying kinetic and thermal
energy, and producing high-quality materials for tools’. China led the world in the use of coke-fuelled
blast furnaces for smelting iron (eleventh century), the widespread use of the vertical water wheel
(thirteenth century onwards), water-powered spinning machines (twelfth century), gunpowder, paper,
chemicals: many of these were not available in Europe till many centuries later.
6 As Pomeranz (2000: 68) puts it, ‘European science, technology, and philosophical inclinations alone
do not seem an adequate explanation, alleged differences in economic institutions and factor prices
seem largely irrelevant’.
7 As one paper declared, ‘... the length of our lives, so far as regards the power of acquiring information
and disseminating power, will be doubled and we may be justified in looking for the arrival of a time
when the whole world will have become one great family, speaking one language..’ (quoted in
Chancellor [1999: 126]). There is a striking similarity with Negroponte’s (1995: 230) more recent
claim that ‘digital living’ would ‘reduce man’s dependence on time and space, close the generation
gap and lead to world unification’.4
shareholders. Notwithstanding this boom and bust, the railway network expanded
dramatically over time, both in Europe and in other parts of the world. The economic
impact of this expansion was very marked. By enabling the low-cost movement of
materials, manufactured goods and people, the railways had a profound influence on
global patterns of production and consumption.8
While the benefits of the railways were global, the distribution of these benefits was
unequal across the globe. Britain was the leading beneficiary. The railway boom
provided a major spurt to industrial Britain in various ways. First, the construction of
railway networks in its overseas colonies provided a direct boost to British steel and
construction industry. Second, the railway network extended the reach of British
industry: both by allowing them to access raw materials from the colonies and by
expanding their markets for manufactures. In contrast, the implications for the colonies
were mixed. For instance, handicraft cloth weavers in India could no longer compete
with the cheap cloth milled in Manchester and went out of business. The railways
encouraged a shift in agriculture from food crops to cash crops, but the greater volatility
in demand for cash crops exposed subsistence farmers to greater risk. Some of these
costs were only transitional and soon outweighed by the long-term benefits of railway
networks, but Britain gained more than others did countries.
These historical examples have some lessons for the new economy. One, the experience
of the industrial revolution tells us that while new technology plays an important role in
economic transformation, other ingredients may be necessary. We must guard against a
new ‘technological fundamentalism’—the idea that new technology is the crucial need
of the developing world—without a careful assessment of other potential constraints
faced by developing countries. Two, the salutary lesson from the early growth of the
railways is the benefits of new technologies are often distributed asymmetrically, with
some nations gaining more than others.
The second point merits elaboration. In the new ‘network economy’, the asymmetry of
distribution of benefits may be even stronger, given its winner-takes-all characteristic.
Many sectors of the modern information economy have the feature that the pioneer
captures all the benefits and there are no prizes at all for being second. In particular, the
first-mover advantage of many US-based corporations may enable them to capture a
disproportionately large share of the gains. As in the railway example, the pioneering
firms are likely to benefit from the dominant role they will play both in the construction
of the network infrastructure, and in the use of the network to access and create markets
for the emerging ‘information industry’. Not surprisingly, then, it is precisely these
firms that are the cheerleaders of the new economy.9
8 In Britain the impact on life and society went further. The railways served to ‘unify time’ (i.e. church
clocks were synchronized to the railway clocks); the possibility of overnight transport from London to
the home counties made it feasible to have a daily national newspaper. The dramatic reduction in
transport costs allowed factories to reduce their inventories, with substantial gains.
9 As Schiller (1999) argues at great length, the strongest advocacy of the ‘need for rapid global
expansion of telecommunication networks’ has come from the mostly US-based corporations that are
most likely to benefit from it. They have come to acquire strong influence in the multilateral agencies
that manage the telecommunications agenda. Their representatives ‘travel the globe, articulating
visions of exponential growth and explaining the magic of Moore’s law and exponential growth’.5
If so, we should admit the possibility that the new economy can increase the gap
between rich and poor countries. This outcome is consistent with two alternative
scenarios: in the first scenario resource constraints prevent poor countries from
acquiring access to information technology, and the resulting digital gap leads to an
economic gap. But there is a second scenario in which the developing countries invest a
lot of resources (diverted from other pressing needs) to close the digital gap, and yet
cannot catch up in economic terms. In the latter scenario, from the developing
countries’ point of view, the new economy would become an expensive distraction.
Despite the latter possibility, I do not believe it is an option for developing countries to
turn their backs on the new economy. Rather, it only reminds us that the strong claims
made by the proponents of the new economy cannot be taken at face value. The success
of the pioneers may not be replicated, at least not to the same extent, for the latecomers
in the new economy. Indeed, Gordon (2000) has argued that new economy may not
quite measure up to the great inventions of the past. If so, the case for investing in the
new economy needs to be made on a more pragmatic and piece-meal basis.
Lest this sound too negative, some caveats. First, the overall gain from the global
network—the digital dividend—is probably very large: through the choice of the right
policies, developing countries can improve their share of this dividend. Two, while the
network advantages tend to work against developing countries, in some cases,
developing countries (especially large developing countries) can turn the balance of
advantage in their favour. I will consider these two issues in turn.
3 The nature of the new economy
The new economy involves a growing importance of ‘knowledge products’ in the total
output of the economy. This includes not only computer software, but also other
services that can be delivered digitally (such as news, entertainment, music, and data).
One relevant feature of knowledge products is that they are costly to produce but cheap
to reproduce. To take an example, it takes thousands of hours of costly programming
time to produce a useful piece of commercial software but once the software code has
been written, it is extremely cheap to make a perfect copy. If copying is freely allowed,
people will be able to acquire this software very cheaply, reducing the financial reward
for the producer of software. To provide the incentive to produce knowledge products,
society must institute a regime of intellectual property rights, or find other means of
encouraging creativity.
A second characteristic of knowledge and knowledge products is that it is often hard for
a user to assess their value till they have experienced them. Take the Internet, for
example. People who have not used the Internet find it hard to appreciate its usefulness.
Experienced users realize what it can do (and what it cannot do). The more experience
you gather, the more you come to value the Internet. Like the Internet, many other
innovations in the information economy are experience goods. In this sense these
innovations differ from previous technological innovations, whose ‘magic’—think of
electricity or the motor car—was relatively easy to appreciate by most people, whether
or not they had used these themselves.6
A third aspect of the modern information and communication technologies is the
network character of the services they enable. For instance, the value of any
communication network depends on the total number of people in the network. The
greater the number of people that participate in the network, the greater the value of
joining the network. If you are the only person in the world with a phone connection, it
is of no use. If many people have phones, it is useful to have a phone yourself. The
returns to participating in the network increase with the number of other users.
What are the consequences of these three characteristics of the new economy for
developing countries? The network aspects, combined with the characteristic that
information goods are experience goods, have some serious implications. In digitally-
rich economies, people have already experienced many knowledge products and, over
time and with experience, come to value them highly. This has resulted in increased
consumption of information goods and strong participation in the new economy. This
makes the network even more valuable, increases the availability of new information
goods, thus increasing the incentive to participate even further. In sum, the use of
networks is self-reinforcing. On the other hand, in digitally-poor economies the same
mechanism stifles growth. In the absence of sufficient experience, the consumption of
information goods remains low. As a result, the value of information networks is small,
and participation is low. This problem may not be so acute in large developing countries
like China and India where the size of the economy mitigates the poverty of networks.
But in small developing countries, the absence of critical mass poses a serious obstacle
to participation in the new economy.
4 Policy implications
How can this vicious circle be broken? The network aspect creates that possibility that
free markets alone will not result in an efficient outcome. It is useful to remember that
the Internet arose out of publicly funded research in defence communications networks.
Public agencies will have a crucial role to play in its extension in developing countries.
By public agencies I refer primarily to the national governments but the list also
includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international agencies operating
in developing countries.
The potential benefits of modern ICTs for developing countries can come through
various channels. The production of new-economy goods and services—say, computer
hardware and software—can add to total output in the economy. The exports of these
products can serve as an engine of growth. The greater use of ICT in the existing sectors
of the economy can result in productivity improvements, say by reducing inventory
costs. Apart from the direct or indirect contributions of ICT for output or exports, the
consumption of ICT would provide direct benefits to the population: communication is,
after all, a basic need at all stages of development. How likely is it that these potentials
will be realized?
4.1 E-government and demand-side initiatives
In many developing countries, the government remains a major agency of social change.
Government agencies in developing countries could boost demand for information7
goods and services by becoming a consumer of new technologies, and thus provide
critical mass for their widespread adoption. This, in my opinion, will serve various
functions. One, by increasing demand for technology-intensive products, it will increase
the incentives for the private sector to invest in the provision of these services. Two,
new technologies have the potential to improve the efficiency of the public sector.
Three, public use of information technology may speed up the diffusion of these
technologies through a demonstration effect.
To appreciate this, consider another railway example. Much before the current Internet
revolution, the Indian Railways, a public-sector enterprise, replaced its 100-year old
paper-based reservation system by a more efficient, centralized, computer network.
Under the old system, allocation of scarce capacity among intermediate points on the
route of a train journey required numerous telegraphic exchange of information. The
new electronic system made it possible for travellers to make reservations for travel
originating from remote locations, with considerable benefit for passengers. But it also
led to great strides in domestic development of software, among other things, to handle
India’s numerous languages and scripts. The crucial fact is that a government
department became a major user of information technology, and thus boosted demand
for new technology. The supply of the technology was left to private enterprise, with
some in-house development. Once the technology ball had started rolling, it acquired its
own dynamic and created many useful offshoots.
The government interacts with people through various channels. One idea might be to
use modern ICT as an additional channel of communication with the public, by creating
what is often called e-government. This will boost demand for elements of the new
economy, and the use of modern technology may also improve governance. Modern
ICT can simplify many routine tasks. Electronic mail can speed up internal
communication. The use of databases can improve storage and retrieval of information,
and reduce paperwork in public administration. Electronic voting mechanisms can
reduce the costs and errors in election processes and increase public confidence in
democratic structures. The Internet can be used to communicate government policy and
regulation, and increase transparency of governance. Government sponsorship of such
activity will also generate local language content for local needs. This may catalyse the
demand for further information services.
Of course, progress of e-government faces many hurdles in developing countries. First,
investing in new technology requires resources that many developing countries do not
have. Apart from financial resources, it requires training and skilled personnel: public
sector salaries are often below the levels necessary to attract these skills. Expensive
equipment is frequently misallocated: new computers often adorn ministerial desks as
status symbols, rather than serve as productivity-enhancing tools at lower levels of
government operation. More importantly, while the lack of enthusiasm about
e-government is blamed on inertia and incomprehension, often there is a more serious
constraint: that many civil servants have a vested interest in preserving the status quo.
Knowledge and control over information flows is usually a source of power in
hierarchical bureaucracies. To the extent that freer access to information will undermine
this power, we should expect a lack of enthusiasm about new technologies. In labour-
surplus economies, there is additional concern about the displacement of labour by
machines. For instance, the computerization of records in the public-sector banks in8
India has been resisted by the trade unions on grounds that it may have adverse effects
on current or future employment.
The sensible way forward is to recognize and anticipate these difficulties. Upgrading the
technological apparatus of public agencies is as much a problem of political economy as
one of choosing the right technology. As Heeks (2002) points out, while many attempts
to foster electronic government have been abject failures, there is a growing set of
positive role models that can be emulated. Andhrapradesh.com, the official website of
one of the poorer Indian states is an example of how e-government can begin to alter
patterns of interaction between governments and citizens. NGOs may have a useful role
to play here.
4.2 Communications access and infrastructure: the supply side
Many people point out that there is more fundamental requirement for participation in
the information economy, namely access and connectivity. Communication networks
currently connect areas of high-income concentration. Developing countries are poorly
connected to global networks, and rural parts of developing countries are often not
connected at all. Creating electronic channels for e-government would be futile if the
vast majority cannot access these channels.
This is the issue of supply of communications infrastructure. In most countries,
telecommunications networks were long run as public-sector monopolies. This may
have been justifiable given the natural monopoly characteristics of these services and
the belief that these services should be run in the larger public interest. In practice, of
course, the public interest was poorly served. Despite the noble intentions, access to
communications facilities remained partial and highly unequal. Technological
developments have altered the original premise. For instance, the declining cost of
mobile telephony has diminished the natural monopoly characteristic of telephony,
making competitive private provision a viable alternative. In the last two decades, many
countries have privatized their national telecommunications monopolies and opened
their networks to competition and foreign capital. Such liberalization has typically
resulted in improved provision, in terms of access and average price. Of course, as the
table below shows, telecommunications still remains a public-sector monopoly in many
countries.
Market structure in telecommunications 2000
Number of countries
Monopoly Duopoly More than two firms
Local telephony 121 19 44
National calls 134 12 36
International calls 129 16 38
Digital cellular 47 28 79
Internet service 13 3 81
Source:UNDP (2001).9
In general, governments need to reassess their objectives carefully. Where
telecommunications continues to be a state monopoly, the sector tends to be a major
source of revenue for the government. Fiscal difficulties make it tempting to set
communications prices in order to maximize revenue than access. Even when
governments have shown readiness to privatize telecommunications, the aim has often
been to maximize privatization revenue or license-fee income rather than to maximize
access to communications. This may be a luxury that most countries can ill-afford.
From a long-term social point of view, it would be far better to create structures that
maximize access without the need for major subsidies. A competitive market structure
may well be compatible with this objective. Privatization is a possible first step, and if
domestic competition is restrained, a pro-competitive regulatory environment may be
important.
Breaking public-sector monopolies in telecommunications is not necessary for
increasing access. Large countries may be able to expand their networks using domestic
resources. China, for one, has greatly expanded access to its telecommunications
network. Between 1990 and 1999 the number of fixed-lines rose from 6 to 86 per 1000
people, and for mobile telephony to 34 per 1000. Significantly, this growth occurred
within the public sector and using domestic resources. Nor can privatization solve the
problem of inequality of access, or extension of access to rural areas. Indeed, it could
make those problems worse as private providers are usually exempt from universal
service obligations and have patterns of pricing that are less favourable to the poorer
sections. Hence each country must assess the case for and against privatization. Where
governments choose to move in favour of competitive markets, the government may
have a continuing role in subsidizing access to deprived groups, or mandating it through
regulatory means.
There is considerable scope of innovative solutions in the private sector. Even in the
poorest countries, people are often prepared to pay for access to communications.
Whether there are clear and immediate benefits to users, they are prepared to invest in
equipment. For instance, ownership of televisions is relatively widespread in India.
While penetration of telephone lines is low, the shared use of existing lines through
phone booths extends access. As one would expect, the emergence of cyber-cafes has
provided shared access to the Internet in large metropolitan areas.
Often small communities can pool resources or use innovative schemes to gain shared
access to expensive services. Bangladesh—one of the poorest countries in the world—
provides a striking example. GrameenPhone is a private scheme that provides mobile
telephony in rural areas through shared access. Mobile phone handsets are made
available on credit-financed franchises to individuals (typically women). They raise
revenue by re-selling telephony services to the local community. The shared use
economizes on a precious resource and enables the provision of primary
communications to rural communities. Revenue per shared rural line is often higher
than average for an urban connection, so these micro-connectivity schemes do not rely
on external funding or subsidy. New technology may increase the scope for such private
ventures by reducing the costs of creating physical and virtual networks.10 The
government can encourage these trends in various ways. In some developing countries,
the state needs to provide the basic infrastructure to make these private-sector initiatives
10 ITU (2000) discusses the feasibility of various communications technologies in rural areas.10
viable. Some public investment in infrastructure and primary communications may be
desirable.
Of course, when it comes to access to the Internet, physical connectivity is not
sufficient. As Nanthikesan (2000) points out, access is also constrained by high cost,
inappropriateness of content (e.g., lack of local language content) and lack of familiarity
with the medium. Often, intermediaries arise to provide indirect access to those who
lack the skill and training to use computers: in many small cities in India, it is possible
to dictate messages that are then delivered using a combination of email and
conventional delivery, all for a relatively low charge. Local innovation in the creation of
low-cost hardware, such as the fledgling Simputer project in India, may help overcome
high hardware costs.
Some have argued that governments should go further than investment in infrastructure
and primary communications. Should the government subsidize the purchase of
computers and other end-users’ hardware? There may be case for subsidizing
institutional access—in schools, universities and medical institutions, for instance—but
in general the case for subsidies is not very persuasive. First, the practical reality is that
even well-intentioned subsidies are often misappropriated. Second, for the vast majority
of people in the developing countries, access to the Internet is not a priority. The
margins of subsistence are defined by access to water, food, health and literacy—as yet,
the Internet does not deliver these directly. The dangerous possibility is that enthusiasm
about the Internet could divert resource from meeting more basic needs. Lastly, as the
GrameenPhone example suggests, individuals and informal markets invent innovative
ways of sharing the use of expensive equipment. Internet cafes and kiosks will arise as
people come to value them.
4.3 Global opportunities and risks
How can developing countries take advantage of the globalization spawned by the new
economy? One possibility, for some developing countries, is to specialize in the
production of knowledge goods. India has benefited from its large reasonably skilled
and English-speaking workforce. Arora and Athreye (2001) point out that India’s
emerging software industry has boosted exports, and at the same time provided a good
exemplar of entrepreneurship and corporate governance to other sectors of the economy.
Many privately run ‘teaching institutes have sprung up to provide the specific IT-skills
needed for this sector’. However, as Chandrasekhar (2001) points out, the largely
unregulated nature of private IT-related education poses potential problems. The lack of
clear standards of technical achievement has undermined the perceived quality of IT-
training in India. While this is not a major impediment in early stages of product cycles,
when Indian software firms are involved in relatively low-value aspects of routine
programming, the lack of advanced skills may make it harder for Indian firms to
migrate to the more profitable areas of software design and development. Indeed, the
largest Indian software firms are acutely aware of this risk and have created their own
‘universities’ to address the problem. But the inability of individual firms to appropriate
the benefits of investment in human capital may result in chronic under-investment. The
government may have a role to play though some amount of regulation and continued
investment in education.11
The Internet has also made it possible for developing countries to compete in the global
market for ICT-enabled services. These range from back-office processing, medical
transcription, and other services performed for firms in the developed world. Low-cost
telecommunications have resulted in call centres to process routine customer queries for
large corporations. Once again, the presence of a large English-speaking workforce has
proven to be a crucial advantage.
It is inevitable that, over time, the Internet will become a major channel of transacting
international trade. Large global corporations are increasingly switching to Internet-only
supply chains and electronic exchanges will soon come to dominate commodity
markets. To retain access to these trade channels, business enterprises in developing
countries will have to adopt this new medium. Large firms in developing countries such
as China have already made considerable progress in using the Internet for developing
their exports.
In the developed world the Internet has been associated with spectacular growth of
electronic commerce. Even as the end of the dot.com boom has led to a more realistic
assessment of the potential of e-commerce, the question remains, how, and to what
extent, can developing countries benefit from e-commerce? Most developing countries
do not currently have the financial structure (e.g. the widespread use of credit cards) and
delivery networks to support growth of domestic electronic commerce. It is futile to
replicate patterns of e-commerce: this will only take up precious resources without
much success. Besides, the winner-take-all characteristic of the new economy suggests
that copying the successful countries will not always work. You may close the digital
gap, but as long as there is a gap, rich countries may capture most of the benefits.
Instead, it is better for developing countries to identify their own problems and ask if
new ICT can solve them. Instead of conventional forms of e-commerce, countries can
use new technologies to improve the functioning of conventional markets. For instance,
if labour markets work imperfectly, electronic labour exchanges could help match
employers with the right employees. If commodity markets don’t work well, electronic
clearing-houses can reduce inefficiencies. Information networks may prove valuable in
improving routine communications, reducing inventory costs, and in planning and
design of supply chains. There are many potential uses in the areas of telemedicine,
distance learning, and agricultural improvement.
There is also a case for closer cooperation amongst the developing countries. First, the
new economy will affect developing countries very differently from its impact on the
developed world, and there is much that they can learn from each other. Second, small
countries lack the resources to build their own information economy and to take
advantage of economies of scale. Coordination can improve the return on their
collective investment. In the past coordination required geographic proximity, so
collaboration naturally led to regional groupings of countries. The information economy
alters the notion of distance: instead of geographic distance, what matters is how close
societies are in terms of their level of development (say, GDP per capita), educational
achievements, etc. Modern grouping will be based on shared needs as delineated by
these criteria. The grouping of Small Islands Developing States is an example of such
an alliance.12
6 Conclusion
It is undeniable that in order to participate in the new economy, developing countries
must invest in communications infrastructure. However, this may not be enough. In the
absence of domestic demand for information goods and services, the new economy will
have little relevance to the vast majority of people in developing countries. The
government and other public agencies can play a useful role in boosting demand. For
instance, the introduction of information technology within government departments is
a means of generating critical mass for participation in the new economy.
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